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ARGUMENT
I.

THE PRECLUSION OF THE LIPPMAN'S EXPERT
WITNESSES IS A SANCTION AND IS TANTAMOUNT TO
A DISMISSAL AND DESERVES MORE CAREFUL
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT.

Coldwell Banker is right in stating that the trial court has been given
great latitude in determining the most efficient and fair manner to conduct
the court's business. Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., P.3d 1, 7
(Utah App. 2007). Rule 37(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states
that:
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document, or other material
... that party shall not be permitted to use the witness,
document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the
failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the
court on motion may take any action authorized by Subdivision
(b)(2).
URCP 37(f) (2209) (Emphasis added).
Unfortunately, the trial court and Coldwell Banker have rigidly
adopted the efficiency of the case management and the exclusion of
witnesses with fervor, while overlooking the fairness and exceptions
to the rule. Both have chosen to gloss over the facts constituting
exigency and good cause, and in the case of Coldwell Banker,
Coldwell Banker has chosen to call the exigent circumstances "tales
of woe" and "tall tales" without addressing whether or not such
l

circumstances are in fact good cause and exigent circumstances
requiring the trial court to exercise discretion. A more reasoned
approach would suggest that the burden of showing it is harmless or
there is good cause must still be analyzed, but that the results of any
sanction must be considered. Due process cannot be skirted by the
label we apply to a sanction. Otherwise, we exalt form over substance.
A. UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 37(f) DOES NOT
REQUIRE THE EXCLUSION OF LIPPMAN'S EXPERT
REPORTS AND IT IS A SANCTION.
Coldwell Banker relies heavily on Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency,
Inc., 2009 UT App 347. Ironically, Coldwell Banker was a party to this
action as well. Coldwell Banker insists that the facts between the cases are
"nearly identical." While the similarities are quite striking, it is the
differences that are remarkable and compelling.
In Posner, Posner failed to disclose an expert witness in a timely
manner. On appeal Posner argued that there was a tacit agreement between
the parties to push the deadline for disclosure out past mediation. Id at ]f 25.
In that case, the trial court found that "no agreement to ignore the discovery
deadline existed, and Posner had not otherwise shown good cause for his
untimely filing." Id.

Unlike Posner, where the trial court considered the proffer that an
agreement was made and made a factual determination that no agreement
existed, this trial seemingly ignores Lippman's justification.
The trial court in denying the motion stated, "[c]laims stated premised
on the need for expert testimony should be filed based on the expert
consultation not the other way around." (R. 2442) Yet, in the motions for
more time to disclose experts witnesses Lippman clearly pointed out the
Court that they need time because one expert witness they had lined up,
Brandon Wood, had backed out at the last minute. (R. 1886, 2382) Such a
statement by the court, in light of specific facts by Lippman in his motion,
puts in grave doubt as to whether the trial court even read the memorandum.
Such egregious oversights by the trial court and its failure to provide
any factual analysis for not believing or otherwise ignoring Lippman's
justification show no exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court.
In Posner, the trial court gave a reasoned factual basis for rejecting
Posner's argument for good cause. In the present case, the court gave no
factual or reasoned analysis for rejecting Lippman's good cause, but rather
gave oddly strange justification that were incongruous with the facts
presented to the trial court by motion, suggesting the perhaps the court did
not even read the memoranda. Such oversights are unacceptable. Rule 37(f)
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requires preclusion "unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party
shows good cause for the failure to disclose." So, while Rule 37(f) does
require preclusion, it very clearly gives exceptions that the trial court either
glossed over or ignored.

B. THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF THE EXPERT
WITNESSES WAS TANTAMOUNT TO DISMISSAL.
Coldwell Banker, once again, cites to Posner, to suggest that a
discovery sanction is not tantamount to a dismissal and that trial court's
action in Posner was an exclusionary sanction and not a dismissal. Rather it
was the lack of a witness that led to the dismissal. Id at f 23, f 8.
Conversely, in that same footnote, this Court stated:
Posner briefly alludes to a violation of his due process rights,
claiming that the trial court dismissed his case as a sanction and
thereby denied him his right to a jury trial. However, Posner
inadequately briefs this challenge*
Id.
Two important points need to be made before briefly revisiting
the Kilpatrick case. Lippman is not suggesting that this is a dismissal,
but rather the results are tantamount to a dismissal and therefore, due
process under a dismissal analysis must be carefully considered as
analogous. Finally, Lippman has adequately briefed a due process
claim and wishes to briefly revisit this claim again.
4

In Kilpatrick v. Bollough Abatement, Inc., 199 P.3d 957 (Utah
2008), the widow the decedent had her husband cremated after the
trial court ordered that an autopsy be done upon his death. Ms.
Kilpatrick out of grief and lapse in judgment cremated her husband
without an autopsy. Id at 966. The trial court dismissed.
The Supreme Court of this state cited the United States
Supreme Court in holding that there was a constitutional limit on the
dismissal of a case and a trial court cannot dismiss a case when failure
to comply was "due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or
any fault of the petitioner." Id citing Societe Internationale Pour
Participation Inustrielles et Commericialeds, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S.
197(1958)
While the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court were dealing with cases of dismissal, the Utah Supreme Court
made it clear that they were concerned with the petitioner being
"denied to a hearing on the merits of the case." Kilpatrick at 966.
While it is clear that a dismissal and an exclusion of necessary
witnesses are in fact different on paper, the results are the same.
Kilpatrick not only addresses dismissals but stands for the larger
proposition of due process ensured by the U.S. Constitution.

5

A hypothetical extension ofKilpatrick serves to illuminate this
point. The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Under
instructions that a dismissal, based upon a discovery violation, was
inappropriate because it violated due process, how well received
would a discovery sanction short of dismissal but tantamount to a
dismissal be received? Is this kind of semantic change acceptable?
The trial court could just merely exclude any evidence of Mr.
Kilpatrick's illness from trial, because no autopsy was performed and
the same result would be achieved. Such a ruling would not be a
dismissal but would be form over substance. This would allow trial
courts to carefully package a ruling to skirt legitimate due process
issues and claim that it was a lack of evidence that lost the case and
not a dismissal. Due process should be protected regardless of how
the violations are termed.
In the present case, no bodies were burned. No permanent
damage was done to any evidence, as it was in Kilpatrick. Yet, the
undisputed evidence presented in the motions by Lippman that he was
unable to find a witness in time (inability according to the Supreme
Court) were summarily cast aside or ignored by the trial court and
called tale tales by Coldwell Banker.

6

Even if this Court does not want to folly adopt the stringent
requirements of due process set forth in Kipatrick, the consideration
or lack thereof by the trial court of the exigent circumstances and
justification falls far short of any standard this Court has adopted or
may adopt and will be addressed later.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
EXCLUDING LIPPMAN'S EXPERT WITNESSES.

Rule 37(f) provides that by rule, a court must exclude evidence when
the evidence is not timely disclosed unless there is no harm or there is good
cause shown. Coldwell Banker wants to beat the war drum that the experts
were not submitted in a timely fashion and therefore should be excluded.
Coldwell also argues that there is no evidence to support the claims of
exigency. Finally, Coldwell Banker gets to the point and argues there is
prejudice and no good cause, but without any actual showing of prejudice or
explanation why there is no good cause shown.
A. TIMELINESS IS NOT CONCLUSIVE IN THIS MATTER
NOR HAS COLDWELL BANKER SUFFICIENTLY
BRIEFED THIS ARGUMENT.
Coldwell Banker argues mat the motion was not timely filed; and,
therefore should be excluded. While admittedly the third motion was far
after the motion discovery deadline, the lateness is excusable, not outcome
determinative in this case, and not properly briefed by Coldwell Banker.
7

The first motion filed by Lippman was done after last minute notice
was given that one report would not be done and the other witness would not
be offering his expertise. Lippman mailed his motion on April 1 at the
expiration of the order, but it was not received until April 3, 2009. Given
the late notice such timing was excusable and until now has not been argued
otherwise.
The third motion was understandably late, given the facts in this case.
Of course Lippman missed the deadline. Perhaps thei motion should have
been couched as a motion to reconsider or better yet a motion to allow the
designation of expert witnesses. Either way, the third motion was only
responsive to the denial of the first motion, to add additional fact for the trial
court and deal with the issue of "staleness." There is no way the third
motion could be filed before the deadline.
It is interesting to note that in multiple cases fhe deadline was missed
and the case was determined on the merits. Posner, is one such example.
Posner missed the deadline for disclosing his witnesses and merely disclosed
his expert two weeks late. Id at f24. The trial court did not refuse to hear
the case on the merits nor did this Court, but rather determined by factual
analysis that there was no justification and prejudice had resulted.

Coldwell admits that they did not oppose the first motion when it was
filed and only objected to the date requested in the motion as stale. To now
go back and reverse course is duplicitous. Given that this Court in Posner
and the Utah Supreme Court in Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980)
(overturned on other grounds) entertained the merits of those case for late
disclosure without a "timely motion9' let alone a motion, speaks of the need
to address this case on the merits rather than trying create technicalities
without citing an legal authority for such an argument. This case should be
heard regardless of whether motions were even filed.
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961
P.2d 305, 313, "[i]t is well established that an appellate court will decline to
consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief." This
includes "no reference to legal authority in support of [their] contention."
Coldwell Banker offers no legal authority or analysis for why this Court
should deny Lippman his day before this Court due to filing dates.
B. THE RECORD DOES HAVE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROBLEMS THAT LIPPMAN HAD IN FINDING AN
EXPERT.
Coldwell Banker, once again without any citation to authority,
suggests that Lippman was required to provide a letter, affidavit, or some
other type of competent evidence to support the claims that they were
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struggling to line up expert witnesses. Coldwell even goes as far as to claim
they are "tall tales."
Coldwell Banker never asked for a hearing or challenged the validity
of the statements of counsel in these motions. Further, Coldwell Banker
never explains why, in essence, those motions should be treated as motions
for summary judgment requiring affidavits and evidence to support the
proffers of counsel.
Coldwell Banker should not be allowed to come before this Court and
for the first time assert more proof is needed without any rules requiring
such. Coldwell Banker or the Court could have requested or required a
hearing to allow counsel to come forward and proffer, or to provide letters or
documentation in detail as to the efforts made to find experts and the last
minute problems. Until now, neither the trial court nor counsel has asked for
such. Instead, Coldwell Banker, for all intents and purposes, calls Lippman
and his counsel liars and asks this court to ignore the undisputed proffers
presented in the motions and a part of the record for this Court.
Finally, like the last argument, Coldwell Banker provides no law or
meaningful analysis just accusations. Under Valcarce, this argument should
be declined.
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C. THE LATE DESIGNATION IS NOT HARMFUL TO
COLDWELL AND IT IS JUSTIFIED.
Coldwell finally addresses the merits of this case by arguing there is
no good cause shown and that Coldwell has been prejudiced. Pursuant to
Rule 37(f) and the applicable case law, if there is no harm or there is good
cause shown, the trial court must exercise its discretion before excluding the
evidence. Further, given the gravity of the results, care must be taken not to
violate due process as earlier explained.
Neither the trial court in its ruling nor Coldwell Banker in its
opposition to the designation of the expert witnesses have given any
meaningful reasons why Coldwell Banker has been harmed other than
general statements about delay in the trial and the costs to Coldwell Banker.
As to the delays in the case, this defies logic. Coldwell Banker comes
in with unclean hands. As pointed out in the Appellants initial brief,
Coldwell Banker had sat virtually idle for months in this case while
Lippman vigorously pursued judgment against other parties and searched for
an expert witness. After months of doing little or nothing, Coldwell Banker
responds to the motion at hand by filing a memorandum in opposition and
filing a request for a final pretrial conference. One must really wonder if
Lippman had not designated his witnesses and asked the trial court to allow
them, whether Coldwell Banker would still be doing next to nothing and
11

waiting as so many parties do in a defensive posture. Coldwell Banker
wants to call Lippman disingenuous and full of false pretense, but at the
same time can offer no explanation as to why they asked for a final pretrial
when Lippman asked to disclose his witnesses as opposed to months before.
The trial court on the other hand, whether intentional or not, sat on the
submitted motion in question here for two months, set a trial date, and then
stated as a fundamental reason for denying the motion that a trial date had
already been set. The trial date was set mere days before the decision was
rendered and two months after the motion was submitted to the Court. All
Lippman asked for was to disclose his witnesses and to give the other side
some time to depose the witnesses if they chose. Such a limited request
could have been granted and completed within those two months the court
sat on both this motion and the pretrial request. No delays can be claimed.
Even if there were to be minimal delays, there is no explanation as to how
insignificant delays would prejudice Coldwell Banker's presentation of their
case.
The only other prejudice claimed is one of financial costs. The trial
court offers no explanation at all and Coldwell Banker offers very little.
Coldwell Banker asserts that they have made trial preparations based
upon Lippman having no expert witnesses. Yet, Coldwell Banker was well
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aware that Lippman intended to have experts as Lippman5 s first motion at
the discovery deadline back in April of 2008 apprised Coldwell of
Lippman5 s intentions nearly a year before Coldwell Banker filed a pretrial
request. Coldwell Banker has shown that no additional expenses would
have been incurred with a late disclosure.
This notion that it is cheaper to try the case without experts on one
side is true but defies logic when applied to Rule 37(f). Any evidence under
Rule 37(f) would be either prejudicial because it helps the side submitting
the evidence and thus requires more work to defend it from the other side or
it is irrelevant and not admissible anyway. With such a broad expansive
interpretation of harm, as proposed by Coldwell Banker, this would render
the harm portion of Rule 37(f) meaningless as it would apply to all cases.
Somewhere a more detailed and explanation of harm should be given.
Even if this Court finds harm, good cause has been shown and
undisputed. In the first motion for more time, Lippman was very specific in
detailing to the Court who his experts were and why he needed more time
and another expert. In the last motion, which is before this Court, Lippman
not only expressed again why he needed an expert, but gave a brief but
detailed explanation of the tremendous efforts that Lippman and his counsel
went through to find a new expert and get his report ready to submit.
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The trial court shrugs of the difficulty of finding an expert and
Coldwell Banker scoffs at the idea and calls Lippman a liar. The reality is
that Coldwell Banker chose experts from within house and has no idea how
difficult it can be to find one expert commercial real estate agent let alone
replace him when he chooses not to testify, when a party doesn't have in
house experts at their beck and call.
Ultimately, the facts before this Court are that Lippman lost an expert
witness and made tremendous and often fruitless efforts to replace that
witness. Such a factually unopposed fact pattern is not only good cause but
constitutes "inability" as espoused by the United States Supreme Court and
echoed by the Utah Supreme Court. Kilpatrick at 966.
Finally, Coldwell Banker spends some time saying that the trial
court's decision to punish Lippman for what happened to Deem is one of the
factors the trial court considered. This is somewhat of a red herring. It is
clearly something the trial court considered. Lippman's contention as
already stated in his original brief is to indicate that such a factor and lack of
other considerations showed an disturbing look by the trial court in the
wrong direction.
Yes, the trial court had previously amended the scheduling order to
compensate for withdrawal of counsel, but not for Lippman. Yes, Lippman
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amended his pleadings to get the right Coldwell Banker because counsel for
Salkin and later Coldwell Banker left it to Lippman to find the right broker.
Lippman had to amend the pleadings to get the right broker.
In fact, as pointed out in the initial brief, the docket is full of
consistent and meaningful effort by Lippman to prosecute this case.
Ultimately, the real problem Lippman has with the order is the trial
court completely ignored Lippman's argument. As pointed out in the initial
brief, it is evident that the trial court completely overlooked the exigent
circumstances in a rush to deny Lippman5 s expert witnesses.
Finally, the decision in Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71 speaks volumes.
In Boice, an expert witness withdrew shortly before trial and the other party
complained of prejudice because there would not be sufficient time to
depose the witness before the trial. The trial court denied the expert witness.
The Utah Supreme Court in reversing that order spoke with a clarion call.
The court stated:
even if it were true that Marble could take the deposition of
three witnesses before trial but not the new expert, the trial
court could have obviated any prejudice granting a motion for a
continuance. Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
allows a court to postpone a trial 'upon good cause shown...5
Given the unexpected nature of Newton's withdrawal, and
considering all the other surrounding circumstances, we
determine the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
Boice's substitute expert witness
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Boiceat^Ill.
This case screams out, like Boice, we lost an expert and need to tind a
new one. This was pointed out long before a trial date was set. The Court
sat on the submitted motion for two months and then set a trial date anyway.
This case screams, like Boice, we have exigent circumstances and good
cause shown. The trial court should have never ignored Lippman's plight.
The trial court did not even need to grant a continuance of trial, as one was
not even set. All the trial court had to do was read Lippman's motion
recognize the good cause shown and deny Coldwell Banker's attempt to
hurry and get this case set for trial.
When good cause is shown, trial courts must follow the guidance of
Boice, and in the interest of justice and due process should make every effort
to accommodate the party in need and were necessary obviate any prejudice.
This is the problem that Lippman has with the trial court's order and
Coldwell Banker's attempt to create its own prejudice and cram a trial date
down Lippman's throat.
III.

LIPPMAN DID PROPERLY MARSHALL SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE THE TRIAL COURT'S
FACTUAL FINDING.

Coldwell Banker relies on various cases to argue that Lippman has the
burden of marshalling the evidence that the trial court's factual finding is

16

incorrect. However, such a simplistic statement is overreaching in its
meaning. First, the context of the cases is dealing with a presentation of
evidence were facts are in dispute and the trial court has to weigh credibility.
Second, what Lippman must is trying to show in disputing the ruling by the
trial is right in the record and has been pointed to this Court in Lippman's
initial brief.
The cases relied upon by Coldwell Banker assess the role of this Court
when conflicting facts are presented to the trial court. A trial court's job is
to "assess the credibility and to assign weight to conflicting evidence."
Burton Lumber and Hardware Company v. Graham, 186 P.3d 1012, 1017
(UT App 2008). "The trial court is in the best position to weigh conflicting
testimony, and assess credibility, and from this make a finding of facts."
Fisher v.Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1178 (UT App 1995).
It is axiomatic that a trial court sits with the best of advantage to see
the presentation of evidence, to weigh the credibility of witnesses, and to try
and find the truth among the varying stories.
In this case, there really are not facts, in the usual sense to marshal.
Most of decision by the trial court states basic facts that are not contested,
and the then berates Lippman for not a J read \ having an expert. A brief
glance and the memoranda show otherwise. There is no dispute of fact or
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judgment of credibility between witnesses here. The trial court either
ignored Lippman's argument or implicitly called him a liar with no
explanation of his or his counsels' credibility.
The trial court claims a trial date was set before this motion was
decided. While this is true, the trial court conveniently ignores that this
motion was submitted two months before the trial court set a court date
based upon a pretrial request submitted with the memorandum in oppositioi 1
to Lippman's motion. Technically, this is true. Intellectually, it is
completely dishonest.
These are just two examples of the myriad of problems with the trial
court's order that have already been addressed in the initial brief. Such
anomalies supported by the record and such lack of consideration of
proffered facts are what is being questioned.
There was no trial. The record is clear. The trial court has no better
vantage point than this Court does as all suppositions as to what the facts are
come from pleadings and the docket. This Court can readily assess the
concerns as pointed out by Lippman without any deference to the trial
court's judgment of conflicts of evidence and credibility as the dispute does
not involve such allegations.
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CONCLUSION
In Boice, a case very similar to this one, the court stated:
[o]n occasion justice and fairness will require that a court allow
a party to designate witnesses, conduct discovery, or otherwise
perform tasks covered by a scheduling order after the courtimposed deadline for doing so has expired. We believe this
case presents such a circumstance.
Id at 110.
Lippman believes such is the case again. The trial coui t igi lored the
good cause shown and the exigency in this case, when the facts are very
similar to those in Boice. Further, the trial court claimed prejudice without
substantiating this claim with any clarity. The trial court abused its
discretion in excluding the disclosure of Lippman5 s experts and precluding
his right to a fair trial.
DATED aiid SIGNED this U day of January, 2010
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C.
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Attorney for Appellant
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